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Business

[02/07] Key states move closer to foreclosure-abuse deal
[02/07] Glencore, Xstrata agree on merger terms
[02/07] Oracle rejects $272M SAP award, wants new trial
[02/07] World stocks lower as Greek debt talks drag on
[02/07] Bernanke is expected to stick with low-rate stance

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Construction

[02/06] Propex's Fibermesh Named #1 Brand in Concrete Construction Magazine Brand Study
[02/03] Final Phase of Homes Now Open at Scotts Glen Estates, Woolwich's Luxury Home Community
[02/03] Chicago Suburban LaGrange Park to Receive Long-Awaited Illinois Grant
[02/03] One Cincinnati Hero to Receive a Free Siding Makeover
[02/03] Rebuilding Together announces 17th Annual Kickoff to Rebuild to Impact Indianapolis Neighborhood

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Employment Practices

[12/29]
[01/24] Job bias claims at record level
[01/11] Pepsi Beverages pays $3.1M in racial bias case
[01/11] Md. man's leave lawsuit lands in Supreme Court
[01/11] Court:Judges cannot get involved in church dispute

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Litigation

[02/06] DEA agents in Puerto Rico claim discrimination
[02/06] JP Morgan to pay $110M to settle overdraft lawsuit
[02/06] Smith & Nephew to pay $22.2M in US settlements
[02/03] World court upholds German immunity in Nazi cases
[02/01] $19.5M asbestos settlement proposed by W.R. Grace

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Case Summaries

Injury & Tort Law

[02/03] Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Roberts
In a suit brought by an insurer seeking a declaratory judgment that it was required to indemnify its insured for no more than 40 percent of a state court judgment because it had covered its insured for no more than 40 percent of the time in which the state court plaintiff was exposed to lead poisoning, the district court's judgment is: 1) affirmed in part, where it was correct in allocating the insurer's liability using the pro-rata time on-the-risk, and its decision to use the plaintiff's date of birth as the starting point for the period in which she was exposed to lead poisoning was sound; and 2) reversed in part, where the district court erred in holding the insurer liable for 24 months of coverage rather than 22, since under the insurance contract, coverage ended when the property was sold.

[02/02] Lore v. City of Syracuse
In a case alleging illegal retaliation against a city police officer under Title VII and the New York State Human Rights Law (HRL) because of her complaints of gender discrimination, the district court's judgment is: 1) affirmed in part where the city's arguments regarding the availability of reputation damages, evidentiary and instructional errors, and excessive damages for emotional distress presented no basis for disturbing the judgment; and 2) vacated in part where there was merit in plaintiff's contentions regarding the liability of the city's corporation counsel, and the district court erred in dismissing her principal gender discrimination claims under the HRL on the basis that she had suffered no materially adverse employment action.

[02/01] Maxton v. Western States Metals
In a suit alleging negligence and strict liability causes of action based on personal injuries as a result of working with metal products manufactured by the defendants and supplied to the plaintiff's employer, the district court's judgment in favor of the defendants on demurrers is affirmed, where: 1) the metal products involved were not inherently dangerous, and no other circumstances justified imposing liability on the defendants for the plaintiff's injuries under the component parts doctrine; 2) the plaintiff did not meet his burden of showing there was a reasonable possibility that the deficiencies in the complaint could be cured by amendment.

[01/30] Sennett v. US
In a suit by a photojournalist seeking money damages against the federal government for FBI agents' alleged violations of the Privacy Protection Act (PPA) stemming from a search of her apartment, the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the United States is affirmed, where: 1) the facts as alleged showed that the officers had probable cause to believe that the plaintiff was involved in criminal activity; and 2) the search of her home related to the investigation of that activity, so that the "suspect exception" to the PPA applied.

[01/27] AE v. County of Tulare
In a suit arising from the sexual assault of a minor by his foster brother, alleging against the county that ran the foster home a claim under 42 USC section 1983 for deliberate indifference and claims for negligence pursuant to California statutes, the district court's dismissal of all claims against the county is reversed, where: 1) the district court abused its discretion when it denied leave to amend the complaint to cure defects in the section 1983 claim; 2) the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the derivative liability claims against the county with prejudice and without leave to amend when it granted leave to amend as to the allegations regarding defendant county social workers.

[01/27] C9 Ventures v. SVC-West, L.P.
In a personal injury suit in which a lessor of helium-filled tanks used to inflate festive balloons cross-complained against the lessee to enforce an indemnification provision on the back of an unsigned invoice, the trial court's judgment in favor of the lessor and award of attorney fees to it is reversed, where: 1) the lessee did not manifest assent to the terms on the back of the unsigned invoice by course of dealing or course of performance, or under basic contract law; 2) the lessee did not sign the invoice or otherwise expressly agree to its terms; 3) an unsigned invoice itself is not a contract, and repeated delivery of a particular form does not make the form part of the parties' agreement; 4) payment of the invoice merely constituted the lessee's performance of the obligation under the oral contract to pay for the rental of the helium-filled tanks; and 5) assuming the transaction was a sale of goods covered by division 2 of the California Commercial Code, the indemnification provision was not an additional term of the contract under section 2207 of the Commercial Code.

[01/26] Munoz v. Sociedad Espanola de Auxilio Mutuo y Beneficiencia de Puerto Rico
In a retaliation case under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) and Puerto Rico's general tort statute known as Article 1802, in which the jury found for the plaintiff, the district court's denial of the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion for a new trial is affirmed, where: 1) the evidence presented at trial was enough to support the jury's finding of retaliation; 2) the appellants waived defenses based on the statute of limitations, the exclusive remedies bar, and a purportedly erroneous jury instruction; 3) the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find the requisite fault or negligence to sustain an Article 1802 claim; and 4) the awards of damages and attorney fees were proper.

[01/26] Allstate Property and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Squires
In an action by an insurance company seeking a declaratory judgment that it was not obligated to pay uninsured motorist benefits to a policyholder, the district court's order granting the insurer's motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing counterclaims is reversed, where in light of the insurer's concession for purposes of its motion that the accident giving rise to the claim was caused by a box dropped from an unidentified vehicle, the accident arose out of the maintenance, ownership, or use of an uninsured vehicle, so that it was covered under the insurance policy.

[01/26] Tverberg v. Fillner Construction, Inc.
In a suit brought by a husband and wife based on injuries sustained after the husband, an independent contractor, was injured on a worksite on which the defendant was operating as the general contractor, judgment against the plaintiffs is reversed, where: 1) the trial court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on a breach of regulatory duty theory of recovery, as the defendant delegated its obligation to comply with Cal-OSHA workplace regulations to the plaintiff; but 2) the trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' retained control theory of direct liability, since the plaintiffs offered sufficient evidence of a triable issue on affirmative contribution.

[01/26] Fortin v. Titcomb
In a case in which a federal jury awarded the appellant $125,000 in damages against a police officer after finding that the officer negligently used force in arresting the appellant, which award the district court reduced to $10,000, the maximum set by the Maine Tort Claims Act (MTCA) for the personal liability of government employees, the following questions are certified to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court: 1) where an insurance policy is available to cover a judgment against a government employee sued in his or her personal capacity, is the limit on the award of damages $10,000 as set by the MTCA at section 8104-D or is the limit set by reference to sections 8105(1) and 8116?; and 2) which interpretive principles should be applied to construe an insurance policy, procured by a governmental body to cover itself or its employees for MTCA damages liability, that contains an ambiguity affecting the scope of coverage?

[01/25] Pearson v. Superior Court (Nicholson)
In a suit by a minor through his guardian ad litem to recover damages for personal injuries, which was settled by the defendants' insurance carrier but not approved by the court because the minor died before the court could rule on the petition for approval, the guardian ad litem's petition for writ of mandate to compel the superior court to grant a motion for approval of the settlement and for its enforcement is granted, as: 1) an agreement compromising the claims of a minor, while the petition for its approval is pending, is voidable only at the election of the minor or his or her guardian; and 2) a defendant or its carrier has no right to object to the petition.

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San Francisco Bay Area Sack Rosendin represents contractors, developers, business entities, and individuals in communities throughout California, including communities such as San Francisco, Oakland, San Jose, Walnut Creek, Santa Rosa, Sacramento, Los Angeles, San Diego, San Francisco County, Alameda County, Contra Costa County, Marin County and more.

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